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CONSUMER NEWS
Plaintiffs' Attorneys Wince as Second
Circuit Applies Tough Twombly Standard
to Antitrust Suits
By Thomas A. McCann*
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit set
a high bar this September for plaintiffs alleging industry-wide
conspiracies to block competition in violation of U.S. antitrust laws.'
The appellate court's per curiam decision provides an early insight
into the new pleading rules set out by the United States Supreme
Court's May 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.
The Second Circuit applied Twombly to dismiss a highly
detailed complaint regarding a price fixing scheme among elevator
companies that would have easily passed
muster in the pre-Twombly
era, according tto experts
xet
ntefed.Teaplaecutssrc
in
the field.3 The appellate court's strict
application of the new pleading rules has corporate defendants
breathing a sigh of relief and plaintiffs lawyers
scrambling to adapt
4
dismiss.
to
motion
a
survive
to
their pleadings
In the Second Circuit case, a putative class of consumers who
purchased elevators and elevator repair and maintenance services
filed a complaint in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
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In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47, 48-9 (2d Cir. 2007).
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2 Bell

3 Posting of Anik Banerjee to Antitrust Law Blog, Second Circuit Applies
Twombly To Dismiss Detailed Allegations Of Antitrust Conspiracy,
http://antitrustlawblog.com (Oct. 8, 2007) [hereinafter Anik Banerjee].
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New York alleging that four major elevator companies engaged in a
conspiracy in the United States and Europe to monopolize the
elevator market.5
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the
companies conspired to fix prices for the sale and continuing
maintenance of their elevators in violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act; 6 that the companies tried to monopolize the market for7
their elevator products in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act;
and that they tried to monopolize the maintenance market for their
individual elevator products by making it difficult for indeFendent
maintenance companies to service each defendant's elevators.
To support these allegations, the plaintiffs asserted that the
defendant elevator companies participated in meetings in the United
States and Europe to discuss pricing and market divisions, agreed to
fix prices for elevators and elevator services, rigged bids for sales and
maintenance, exchanged price quotes, "collusively" required
customers to enter long-term maintenance contracts, and collectively9
took actions to drive independent repair companies out of business.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs also made specific reference to
government investigations by Italy and the European Union into the
defendants' alleged antitrust violations, as a result of which the
European Commission raided each defendant's offices and levied
"extraordinary° fines" on the companies after they admitted
wrongdoing.
The district court, however, dismissed the complaint. The
appellate court upheld the dismissal, holding that the complaint's
conspiracy allegations provided "no Rlausible ground to support the
inference of an unlawful agreement."
The court wrestled with the U.S. Supreme Court's new
mandate set down in Twombly, acknowledging that there is still
"considerable uncertainty" as to how broadly it should be applied. 12
In Twombly, a class of plaintiffs alleged that four major telephone
5 In
6

re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d at 48-9.
See 15 USC § 1.

7 See

15 USC § 2.

8 Id. at 49.

9 Id. at 51; Anik Banerjee, supra note 3.
'0 In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d at 49, 51.
"Id. at 48-9.
12 Id. at 50.
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local exchange carriers colluded to frustrate new competitors from
entering the market pursuant to the 1996 Telecommunications Act,
which required the established carriers to sell local telephone services
at wholesale rates, lease unbundled network services and permit
interconnection to the fledgling new competitors.' 3 The plaintiffs'
allegations consisted of claims that the defendants agreed not to enter
each other's territories and to work jointly against the new
competitors.14 However, the complaint had no independent factual
allegations of a negotiated agreement by the defendant companies,
such as a specific meeting.' 5 After the complaint was dismissed, the
Second Circuit revived the lawsuit, saying that an inference could be
drawn that an illegal agreement must have taken place at some time if
collusion in fact occurred. 16
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the ruling, holding that to
survive a motion to dismiss, it is not enough to make allegations of an
antitrust conspiracy that are consistent with an unlawful agreement;
to survive, the complaint must contain "enough factual matter (taken
as true) to suggest that an agreement [to engage in anticompetitive
conduct] was made."' 17 While the new standard did not require
heightened fact pleading of specific events, it did require enough
facts to "nudge the [plaintiffs'] claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible."' 8 The decision meant that, at least for
some types of antitrust violations, courts could no longer apply the
general federal pleading standards of Conley v. Gibson, where a court
cannot dismiss unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to
relief.' 9
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court cited the
potentially enormous discovery costs in antitrust cases, and it
explained that district courts must "retain the power to insist on some

"3Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1962.
14Id. at

1962-3.

"5Id.
at 1962.
16 Id

"7Id. at 1965.
18

Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974.

19Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-6 (1957).

Consumer News

2008]

235

specificity in pleading before
allowing a potentially massive factual
20
proceed.
to
controversy
In the elevator litigation, the plaintiffs argued that three parts
of their complaint met the Supreme Court's new "plausibility"
standard in Twombly: 1) Averments of agreements made between the
defendant companies at some unidentified place and time; 2)
averments of parallel conduct; and 3) averments suggesting
2
anticompetitive wrongdoing by several of the defendants in Europe. F
However, the Second Circuit called the allegations about
agreements between the companies merely conclusory and that they
amounted to "basically every type of conspiratorial activity that one
could imagine. 2 2 The court went on to agree with the district court
that "[t]he list is in entirely general terms without any specification of
any particular activities by any particular defendant[; it] is nothing
more than a list of theoretical possibilities, which one could postulate
without knowing any facts whatsoever."2 3 The court said that simply
alleging meetings or agreements at some unidentified time and place,
with nothing more, is not enough, implying that plaintiffs must have
concrete knowledge of the meetings for the allegation to get past the
complaint stage. 24
The plaintiffs then alleged that parallel conduct by the
companies, such as "similarities in contract language, pricing, and
equipment design," stated enough facts to prove there was an
antitrust conspiracy.
However, the court reasoned that while this
alleged conduct was consistent with a conspiracy, it is "just as much
in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business
strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the
market." 26 The court went on to say that similar contract terms can
reflect "similar bargaining power and commercial goals (not to
mention boilerplate)," and similar contract wording can reflect
"copying of documents that may not be secret." 27 Furthermore, the

20

Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1967.

21

In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d at 50.

22 Id.

23

Id. at 50-1.

24

In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d at 51.

25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
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court said that similar pricing can mean effective competition just as
much as it can mean an anticompetitive conspiracy,S21
and similar
Twombly
equipment design can just reflect state of the art design.
squarely addressed the problem of alleging parallel conduct, and the
U.S. Supreme Court stated that:
[p]arallel conduct.. .gets the complaint close to stating a
claim, but without some further factual enhancement, it
stops short of the line 29between possibility and plausibility
of entitlement to relief.
The plaintiffs next asserted that the extensive allegations of
misconduct in Europe were enough prove the plausibility of an
antitrust conspiracy among the elevator companies. 30 The plaintiffs
alleged that the incriminating evidence from Europe reflected the
existence of a "worldwide conspiracy"; and that even though the
misconduct was not in the United States, the market for elevators is a
global one, and the prices charged abroad affect the prices in the
United States and vice versa. 3 1 Still, the court declared that the
plaintiffs pleaded insufficient facts, reasoning that "anticompetitive
wrongdoing in Europe, absent any evidence of linkage between such
foreign conduct and conduct here - is merely to suggest.. .that 'if it
happened there, it could have happened here."' 32 The court scolded
the plaintiffs for including nothing in their allegations about global
marketing strategies or fungible products, no assertions that the
companies monitored prices in multiple markets, and no proof that
the actual prices of elevators or maintenance
in the United States
33
Europe.
in
actions
the
by
affected
were
Finally, the plaintiffs suing the elevator companies alleged
that the defendants unilaterally engaged in "exclusionary conduct" to
create or attempt to create a monopoly in the maintenance market for
its own elevators. 34 The plaintiffs alleged the defendants designed
their elevators to prevent servicing by any other providers, including

28 Id.

29 Twombly, 127
30

S. Ct. at 1966.

In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d at 51.

31 Id.
32

In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d at 52.

33 Id.

34Id.
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the other defendants; refused to sell to competitors the parts, tools,
software programs and blueprints necessary to repair their elevators;
and obstructed competing companies' attempts to purchase elevator
parts. 35 However, the appellate court dismissed this section of the
complaint as well, reasoning that the Sherman Act allows companies
in an entirely private business to deal with whatever third parties they
choose, and that refusing to do so is not an antitrust violation. 36 The
only exception the court recognized was that companies are
prohibited from terminating "a prior (voluntary) course of dealing
with a competitor," because "the unilateral termination suggest[s] a
willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an
anticompetitive end.",37 The court implies that only this type of
conduct would violate § 2 of the Sherman Act because it would drive
businesses out of a pre-existing market and raise prices for repair
work that had previously been offered for a lower price. 38 The court
said a plaintiff would have to prove the terminations were part of a
"scheme of willful acquisition.. .of monopoly power." 39 However,
because the plaintiffs
alleged no such terminations, they failed to
°
claim.
a
state
The Second Circuit's exacting interpretation of the Twombly
standard has driven home the tough new playing field for antitrust
lawsuits, according to plaintiffs' lawyers. 4 1 The case also shows that
the Twombly standards may affect a much broader range of antitrust
suits than previously thought.42 J. Douglas Richards, the attorney
who argued and lost the Twombly case before the U.S. Supreme
Court, has contended that the impact of the holding, even in antitrust
conspiracy cases, would be very small, and that to survive a
defendant's motion to dismiss, a plaintiff need only point to a
meeting that could have occurred shortly before the alleged antitrust

35 Id.
36 Id.
37

In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d at 53.

38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41

Anik Banerjee, supra note 3.

42

Steve Lash, Reach of Antitrust Ruling Debated, CHI.

15, 2007, at Al.

DAILY

L. BULL., Nov.
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violation, such as price fixing.4 3 However, many defense attorneys
have "declared open season on plaintiffs," aggressively citing
Twombly to dismiss a wide range of business cases where plaintiffs'
claims are short on facts and long on inferences of illegal meetings.4 4
The Second Circuit's elevator litigation ruling provides further
ammunition to the defense bar in dismissing expensive antitrust cases
early.4 5

43 Id.
44 Id.

45 Anik Banerjee, supra note 3.

